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________________ 
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
We revisit equitable mootness, a judge-made 
abstention doctrine that allows a court to avoid hearing the 
merits of a bankruptcy appeal because implementing the 
requested relief would cause havoc.
1
  As many courts have 
noted, though its name suggests mootness in the 
constitutional sense, that is where the similarity between the 
doctrines ends.  See, e.g., In re UNR Industries, Inc., 20 F.3d 
766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994).  Mootness is a threshold issue that 
prevents a federal court from hearing a case where there is no 
live case or controversy as required by Article III of our 
Constitution.  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988).  
Equitable mootness, in contrast, does not ask whether a court 
can hear a case, but whether it should refrain from doing so 
because of the perceived disruption and harm that granting 
relief would cause.
2
  Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors 
                                              
1
 Bankruptcy courts have also invoked the doctrine 
outside the appellate context, for example, in dismissing a 
complaint seeking revocation of plan confirmation under 11 
U.S.C. § 1144.  See In re Innovative Clinical Solutions, Ltd., 
302 B.R. 136, 140–41 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).  We take no 
position on whether use of the doctrine there is appropriate. 
 
2
 The danger of courts conflating the doctrines has led 
Judge Easterbrook to “banish ‘equitable mootness’ from the 
(local) lexicon” in the Seventh Circuit.  UNR, 20 F.3d at 769.  
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of LTV Aerospace and Defense Co. v. Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay 
Corp.), 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993).   
Equitable mootness comes into play in bankruptcy (so 
far as we know, its only playground) after a plan of 
reorganization is approved.  Once effective, reorganizations 
typically implement complex transactions requiring 
significant financial investment.  Following confirmation of a 
plan by a bankruptcy court, an aggrieved party has the 
statutory right to appeal the court’s rulings.  Nonetheless, if 
debtors or others believe granting the requested relief would 
disrupt the effected plan or harm third parties, they may seek 
to dismiss the appeal as equitably moot.  Their contention is 
that even if the implemented plan is imperfect, granting the 
relief requested would cause more harm than good. 
Courts have rarely analyzed the source of their 
authority to refuse to hear an appeal on equitable mootness 
grounds.
3
  The most plausible basis is found in federal 
common law.  See UNR, 20 F.3d at 769.  The Bankruptcy 
Code forbids appellate review of certain un-stayed orders, see 
                                                                                                     
Though we do not ban the term (it is encrusted enough that 
we suffer its continued usage), “prudential forbearance” more 
accurately reflects the decision to decline hearing the merits 
of an appeal because of its feared consequences. 
 
3
 When we adopted equitable mootness, we did not, as 
then-Judge Alito noted in dissent, “undertake an independent 
analysis of the origin or scope of the doctrine but [were] 
instead content to rely on the decisions of other courts of 
appeals.”  In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 568 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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11 U.S.C. §§ 363(m), 364(e), and restricts post-confirmation 
plan modifications, see id. § 1127.  Though these provisions 
arguably express a policy favoring the finality of bankruptcy 
decisions, the Code does not expressly limit appellate review 
of plan confirmation orders.  In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 
229, 240 (5th Cir. 2009); UNR, 20 F.3d at 769.  Courts have 
filled this gap by declining to hear appeals where they 
perceive that the interests of finality outweigh those of the 
appealing party.   
Because we have already approved the doctrine 
(though narrowly in a 7-6 en banc ruling), In re Continental 
Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(“Continental I”), we need not detour ourselves to consider 
whether federal common law can support its use.  Its judge-
made origin, coupled with the responsibility of federal courts 
to exercise their jurisdictional mandate, obliges us, however,  
to proceed most carefully before dismissing an appeal as 
equitably moot. 
Turning to the specifics of this appeal, Appellants are 
four Oklahoma producers (collectively, the “Appellants”)4 
that supplied oil and gas to SemCrude, L.P. and related 
entities (collectively, the “Debtors” or, following 
reorganization, the “Reorganized Debtors”) on credit.  Shortly 
after Debtors petitioned for bankruptcy, Appellants filed a 
complaint contending that they retained property and 
statutory lien rights in those commodities.  On multiple 
occasions, Appellants asserted—either in objecting to the 
Bankruptcy Court’s rulings or in seeking interlocutory 
                                              
4
 They are Luke Oil Company, C&S Oil/Cross Properties 
Inc., Wayne Thomas Oil and Gas, and William Earnhardt Co.  
Debtors are affiliated companies whose bankruptcies are 
jointly administered. 
6 
 
appellate review—that their claims against Debtors could not 
be discharged without affording them the opportunity to 
litigate their claims in an adversary proceeding.  Yet they 
have never been given that opportunity.   
Following confirmation of Debtors’ reorganization 
plan, which constitutes a final judgment in bankruptcy cases, 
In re  PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2000), 
Appellants appealed to the District Court.  Again they were 
turned away, this time because their appeal was deemed 
equitably moot.   
They now appeal to us.  Because we agree that the 
evidentiary record does not support dismissal of that appeal 
for equitable mootness, we reverse the District Court’s order 
and remand for it to hear the merits of Appellants’ appeal.  
I. Background 
Debtors were (and continue to be following 
reorganization) a midstream oil and gas business engaged in 
the gathering, transportation, storage, and marketing of crude 
oil and other petroleum products.  In July 2008, they filed 
voluntary petitions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Numerous producers (the “Producers”), like Appellants, had 
supplied oil and gas to Debtors on credit prior to their filing 
for bankruptcy.  In the Bankruptcy Court, these Producers 
asserted a variety of claims against Debtors entitling them to 
receive distributions from the proceeds of the oil and gas 
ahead of other creditors.  Debtors and Appellants disagreed 
about the appropriate mechanism for resolving these claims.   
Debtors filed a motion to establish global procedures.  
They entitled the Producers to file one representative 
proceeding for each state in which they supplied oil and gas 
to Debtors.  All interested parties had the right to brief, and 
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present oral argument on, their claims.  Regardless whether a 
Producer participated, however, the legal rulings from the 
representative action would be binding on it.   
Appellants objected to these procedures.  They argued 
that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure entitled them 
to an adversary proceeding on their claims.  About the same 
time, they filed a complaint asserting their individual claims 
against Debtors and seeking class certification to assert those 
of similarly situated Producers in Oklahoma. 
The Bankruptcy Court granted Debtors’ motion to 
implement their proposed resolution procedures and stayed 
Appellants’ adversary proceeding.  After filing an 
unsuccessful motion for reconsideration with the Bankruptcy 
Court, Appellants sought leave from the District Court to file 
an interlocutory appeal challenging the procedures.  That 
Court—noting that “the question of whether [Appellants] 
will, in fact, be bound by the[] outcome [of the representative 
proceedings] can be litigated at a later date”—declined to 
hear the appeal.  In re SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R. 553, 557 (D. 
Del. 2009).  
Several representative proceedings—asserting rights 
under Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, New Mexico, and Wyoming 
law—were subsequently filed.  Other Producers based in 
Oklahoma (but not Appellants) filed a representative 
proceeding asserting that they retained property interests and 
statutory liens in the oil and gas they supplied to Debtors.  
The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment against the 
Oklahoma-based Producers.  In re SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R. 
140 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).  It similarly rejected the claims of 
Producers from Kansas and Texas.  In re SemCrude, L.P., 407 
B.R. 82 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (Kansas); In re SemCrude, 
L.P., 407 B.R. 112 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (Texas).  
Recognizing the novelty of these issues, however, the Court 
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sua sponte certified direct appeals to our Court under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(d)(2). 
Before we heard these appeals (or the Bankruptcy 
Court issued rulings in the other representative proceedings), 
Debtors, their senior secured lenders, and an Official 
Producers Committee reached a settlement that purported to 
resolve the claims of all the Producers (the “Producer 
Settlement”).5  Debtors subsequently filed a reorganization 
plan incorporating the terms of the Producer Settlement.  
Among other things, the settlement provided over $160 
million in distributions to the Producers in exchange for the 
discharge of their claims.  It also required the voluntary 
dismissal of all adversary proceedings and other litigation 
related to the Producers’ claims.   
Appellants were not involved in negotiating the 
Producer Settlement and did not expressly agree to its terms.  
Through its incorporation into the reorganization plan, the 
settlement nonetheless set the cash distributions they would 
receive, though they were able to obtain a waiver of the 
requirement that they dismiss their adversary proceeding. 
The plan placed Appellants, along with other 
claimants, into classes of similarly situated creditors, and 
gave them the opportunity to vote on and object to the 
reorganization plan.  The requisite majority of claimants in 
each of these classes voted to accept the plan.  Two of the 
Appellants voted for it, and two abstained from voting.  All 
four of the Appellants, however, filed objections to the plan 
asserting that they should be permitted to proceed with their 
adversary proceeding.  Following a hearing, the Bankruptcy 
                                              
5
 The Official Producers Committee was formed 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).  Its members were 
appointed by the United States trustee.  Id. 
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Court overruled their objections, approved the plan, and 
entered a confirmation order in October 2009.   
Appellants appealed to the District Court.  They again 
asserted that the reorganization plan could not validly 
discharge their claims without affording them the procedural 
protections of an adversary proceeding, and requested that 
they be permitted to proceed in the Bankruptcy Court.  They 
did not seek a stay pending appeal.   
Partly as a consequence of their failure to obtain a stay, 
the plan went into effect.  On November 30, 2009 (the plan’s 
effective date), several corporate restructuring transactions, 
the repayment of certain payment obligations, and the 
issuance of securities to those parties receiving equity 
distributions, were implemented.   
Debtors sought to dismiss the appeal as equitably 
moot.  Among other things, they argued that granting 
Appellants’ requested relief would require unraveling the 
reorganization plan and harm numerous third parties.  To 
avoid these feared outcomes, the District Court dismissed the 
appeal.  In re SemCrude, L.P., No. 09 Civ. 994, 2012 WL 
1836353 (D. Del. May 21, 2012).  Appellants appeal, and ask 
us to vacate that order and remand with instructions to hear 
the merits of their appeal. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction of this appeal under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) and 1334.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  We review the Court’s equitable 
10 
 
mootness determination for abuse of discretion.
6
  Continental 
I, 91 F.3d at 560. 
III. The Equitable Mootness Doctrine 
Following confirmation of a reorganization plan by a 
bankruptcy court, an aggrieved party has the statutory right to 
appeal the court’s rulings.  Once there is an appeal, there is a 
“virtually unflagging obligation” of federal courts to exercise 
the jurisdiction conferred on them.  Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 
(1976).  Before there is a basis to forgo jurisdiction, granting 
relief on appeal must be almost certain to produce a 
“perverse” outcome—“chaos in the bankruptcy court” from a 
plan in tatters and/or significant “injury to third parties.”  In 
re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citing Nordhoff  Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 
180, 184 (3d Cir. 2001); Continental I, 91 F.3d at 560–61).  
Only then is equitable mootness a valid consideration.  
In determining whether an appellate court should 
dismiss an appeal on this ground, we assess five prudential 
factors: 
(1) whether the reorganization 
plan has been substantially 
                                              
6
 As we recently noted, “[t]hen Circuit Judge Alito 
criticized this standard of review as contradicting our 
precedent that where the district court sits as an appellate 
court, we exercise plenary review.”  In re Phila. Newspapers, 
LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 167–68 n.10 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
Continental I, 91 F.3d at 568 n.4).  We are inclined to agree 
with this criticism, but nonetheless are bound to review for 
abuse of discretion. 
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consummated, (2) whether a stay 
has been obtained, (3) whether the 
relief requested would affect the 
rights of parties not before the 
court, (4) whether the relief 
requested would affect the success 
of the plan, and (5) the public 
policy of affording finality to 
bankruptcy judgments. 
Continental I, 91 F.3d at 560. 
These factors, as we explained recently, are 
interconnected and overlapping.  Phila. Newspapers, 690 
F.3d at 168–69.  “The second factor principally duplicates the 
first in the sense that a plan cannot be substantially 
consummated if the appellant has successfully sought a stay.”  
Id. at 169 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  In 
analyzing the first factor, courts have asked “whether 
allowing an appeal to go forward will undermine the plan, 
and not merely whether the plan has been substantially 
consummated under the Bankruptcy Code’s definition.”  Id. 
at 168-69 (citations omitted).  This collapses the first and 
fourth factors.  The third factor adds an additional 
consideration—whether granting relief will undermine “the 
reliance of third parties, in particular investors, on the finality 
of [plan confirmation].”  Id. at 169 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  “Finally, the fifth factor supports the other 
four by encouraging investors and others to rely on 
confirmation orders, thereby facilitating successful 
reorganizations by fostering confidence in the finality of 
confirmed plans.”  Id. at 169. 
In practice, it is useful to think of equitable mootness 
as proceeding in two analytical steps: (1) whether a confirmed 
plan has been substantially consummated; and (2) if so, 
12 
 
whether granting the relief requested in the appeal will (a) 
fatally scramble the plan and/or (b) significantly harm third 
parties who have justifiably relied on plan confirmation.   
Substantial consummation is defined in the 
Bankruptcy Code to mean the 
(A) transfer of all or substantially 
all of the property proposed by the 
plan to be transferred;  
(B) assumption by the debtor or 
by the successor to the debtor 
under the plan of the business or 
of the management of all or 
substantially all of the property 
dealt with by the plan; and  
(C) commencement of distribu-
tion under the plan.  
11 U.S.C. § 1101.  Satisfaction of this statutory standard 
indicates that implementation of the plan has progressed to 
the point that turning back may be imprudent.  
If this threshold is satisfied, a court should continue to 
the next step in the analysis.  It should look to whether 
granting relief will require undoing the plan as opposed to 
modifying it in a manner that does not cause its collapse.  See 
In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 329 F.3d 338, 343–44 (3d Cir. 
2003) (appeal not equitably moot where disgorgement of 
professional fees would not unravel plan); United Artists 
Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 228 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(appeal not equitably moot where striking indemnification 
provision would allow the plan to stay otherwise intact); 
PWS, 228 F.3d at 236 (appeal not equitably moot where plan 
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could go forward even if certain releases were struck from it).  
It should also consider the extent that a successful appeal, by 
altering the plan or otherwise, will harm third parties who 
have acted reasonably in reliance on the finality of plan 
confirmation.  See In re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 
210 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Continental II”); Continental I, 91 F.3d 
at 562. 
We have never explicitly addressed which party bears 
the burden to prove that, weighing these factors, dismissal is 
warranted.  Dismissing an appeal over which we have 
jurisdiction, as noted, should be the rare exception and not the 
rule.  It should also be based on an evidentiary record, and not 
speculation.  To encourage this, we join other Courts of 
Appeals in placing the burden on the party seeking dismissal. 
See, e.g., In re Lett, 632 F.3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 2011); In 
re Paige, 584 F.3d 1327, 1339–40 (10th Cir. 2009); In re 
Focus Media, Inc., 378 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2004).
7
    
Though some courts have shifted the burden to the 
appellant when a plan has been substantially consummated, 
                                              
7
 Despite our never directly addressing this issue, in 
other cases we have focused on whether the debtors/appellees 
provided evidence supporting an equitable mootness ruling.  
Compare Continental I, 91 F.3d at 563 (affirming a dismissal 
based, in part, on the testimony of the debtors’ expert that the 
investors would have the option to withdraw if the appeal 
were successful), with Continental II, 203 F.3d at 210–11 
(declining to dismiss because, in part, the debtors did not 
provide any evidence that third parties relied on the 
foreclosure of appellants’ requested relief in deciding to 
support the plan).  It is not inconsistent with these decisions 
to place the burden on the party seeking dismissal. 
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see, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re 
Chateaugay Corp.), 94 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir.1996), we do 
not adopt that approach.  Whether a plan has been 
substantially consummated often depends, as in LTV Steel, on 
whether a stay has been issued.  However, neither the 
Bankruptcy Code nor any other statute predicates the ability 
to appeal a bankruptcy court’s ruling on obtaining a stay.8  As 
such, we are unwilling to shift the burden to the appealing 
party based on its failure to do something Congress has not 
required it to do.  
IV. Applicability of Equitable Mootness 
Before applying the prudential factors to this appeal, 
we note a preliminary issue raised by the parties.  Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001 provides that certain 
bankruptcy matters—including, according to Appellants, their 
claims—must be resolved through adversary proceedings.  
Those proceedings, which approximate civil actions, provide 
similar procedural protections as the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 7001.01 (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, eds., 16th ed. rev. 2013).  The 
parties disagree on whether an appeal asserting a denial of 
these protections can be dismissed as equitably moot. 
Appellants assert that the equitable mootness doctrine 
cannot preclude their appeal because they have a due process 
right to an adversary proceeding that overrides any interest in 
preserving the finality of confirmation orders.  They rely on 
our decision in In re Mansaray–Ruffin, 530 F.3d 230 (3d Cir. 
                                              
8
 The Bankruptcy Code does forbid appellate review of 
certain un-stayed orders.  See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (order to 
sell or lease property); id. § 364(e) (order to obtain post-
petition financing).  Because of these statutory bars, however, 
equitable mootness is irrelevant in those instances. 
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2008), to support that argument.  There, a debtor purported to 
invalidate a lien on her property by providing for it as an 
unsecured claim in her confirmed plan instead of filing an 
adversary proceeding.  Id. at 243.  Though confirmed plans 
are normally binding, 11 U.S.C. § 1327, we held that this did 
not preclude the creditor from seeking to enforce the lien in a 
subsequent action.  Id.  Where Rule 7001 “require[s] an 
adversary proceeding—which entails a fundamentally 
different, and heightened, level of procedural protections—to 
resolve a particular issue, a creditor has the due process right 
not to have that issue resolved without one.”  Id. at 242.  “The 
mandatory nature” of this due process right “trump[s] [the] 
finality” of confirmed plans.  Id. at 238.  Appellants assert 
that their right to an adversary proceeding similarly overrides 
any finality interests promoted by the equitable mootness 
concept. 
Debtors respond that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 
(2010), effectively overrules Mansaray.  A creditor filed a 
motion in Espinosa seeking relief from a confirmation order 
on the ground that the debtor had attempted to discharge her 
student loan debt without filing an adversary proceeding as 
required by the Bankruptcy Rules.  The Supreme Court held 
that this error was insufficient to vacate the Bankruptcy 
Court’s order confirming the plan.  Id. at 269–72.  Though 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), which allows a 
court to void a final judgment, “applies . . . where [the] 
judgment is premised . . . on a violation of due process,” the 
failure to file an adversary proceeding did not deny the 
creditor due process.  Id. at 271–72.  To the contrary, 
sufficient process was afforded by providing notice of and an 
opportunity to object to the debtor’s plan.  That holding, 
Debtors argue, overturns our determination in Mansaray that 
the Bankruptcy Rules establish due process rights that can 
trump finality.  
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Though this issue is intriguing, we need not, and do 
not, address it in this opinion.  This is so because, no matter 
how we would resolve the issue, equitable mootness was not 
a proper shield here.   
V. Application of the Equitable Mootness Factors 
With that backdrop, we turn to this appeal.  Based 
largely on a non-precedential decision of this Court, see In re 
SemCrude, L.P., 456 F. App’x 167 (3d Cir. 2012), the District 
Court found that the plan was substantially consummated.  It 
also observed that Appellants had failed to seek or obtain a 
stay.  We have no qualms with those determinations.  
However, it also found that granting relief to Appellants 
would undermine the reorganization plan confirmed by the 
Bankruptcy Court and harm third parties.  Because the record 
does not support these latter, and crucial, findings, we hold 
that the Court abused its discretion in dismissing Appellants’ 
appeal. 
A. Substantial Consummation and Obtaining a Stay  
 The parties do not dispute, and we know no reason to 
disagree, that the reorganization plan has been substantially 
consummated, due in part to Appellants’ failure to obtain a 
stay.  Distributions have been made to creditors, financial 
transactions were put in place, and the Reorganized Debtors 
have emerged from bankruptcy as a financially sound, indeed 
thriving, oil and gas business.  Though Appellants would 
have been wise to seek a stay to stop the prospect of equitable 
mootness in its tracks, their statutory right to appeal, as noted, 
is not premised on their doing so.  We thus turn to whether 
granting them relief will have the feared outcomes—
collapsing the plan and significantly injuring third parties 
who reasonably relied on its implementation—with which 
equitable mootness is ultimately concerned. 
17 
 
B.  Success of the Plan 
  Debtors make the all-or-nothing assertion that 
[p]roviding even a modicum of 
relief to [Appellants] would upset 
the delicate balance of the 
[Producer] Settlement embodied 
in the Plan. . . .  The rulings of the 
Bankruptcy Court in the 
[representative proceedings] 
created the basis of the intense 
negotiations that led to the 
Settlement and eventually resulted 
in the overwhelming majority of 
the Producers supporting the Plan.  
Affording the Appellants the relief 
they seek would necessitate 
unraveling the entire Plan. 
Debtors’ Br. at 42–43 (emphases added).    
These conclusions are unsupported by the evidence.  It 
is important to understand Appellants’ requested relief.  They 
do not assert that the central compromise of the Producer 
Settlement is impermissible.  They simply seek a ruling that 
the plan did not discharge their claims, and ask for the 
opportunity to assert them in an adversary proceeding.
9
  We 
                                              
9
 Debtors rely on In re U.S. Brass Corp., 169 F.3d 957 
(5th Cir. 1999).  There, the confirmed reorganization plan 
incorporated a settlement between a group of creditors and 
the debtor that entitled the settling creditors to 80% of the 
debtor’s insurance recoveries.  Id. at 958–59.  The remaining 
20% of recoveries were designated for the other creditors in 
the class.  Id.  The latter creditors asserted on appeal that this 
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have no indication—other than Debtors’ “Chicken Little” 
statements—that this would upset the Producer Settlement or 
that doing so would cause the remainder of the plan to 
collapse. 
Even if Appellants are successful on their claims—far 
from a certain result—the amounts involved will not require a 
sufficient redistribution of assets to destabilize the financial 
basis of the settlement.  Appellants have already received 
$210,445.83 under the current plan.  They claim that they are 
entitled to an additional $207,300.62.  This is a relatively 
minor amount, less than 0.15% of the over $160 million 
designated for distribution to the Producers.  It pales even 
more in the context of the entire reorganization plan, which 
involved over $2 billion.  The amount sought by Appellants is 
roughly one-tenth of one percent of that sum.   
We also fail to see any indication that allowing 
Appellants to proceed with their claims would result in a 
deluge of other Producers filing their own adversary 
proceedings.  Unlike with Appellants, we are unaware of any 
evidence in the record showing that other Producers objected 
to the discharge of their claims or asserted the right to an 
adversary proceeding.  In return for distributions they 
received under the plan, other Producers were required to 
dismiss with prejudice any adversary proceedings they had 
filed.  Absent their objecting at the time of plan confirmation 
                                                                                                     
provision violated 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4), which requires a 
confirmed plan to treat the same all creditors within a class.  
Id. at 958.  The Court dismissed the appeal as equitably moot 
rather than reaching its merits primarily because a successful 
appeal would have required it to excise the entire settlement, 
and thus destabilize the remainder of the plan.  Id. at 962. 
Those spectors are not before us. 
19 
 
to this dismissal requirement (as well as to the discharge of 
their claims), they cannot now attempt to restart those actions.   
Debtors’ best argument is that Appellants’ adversary 
proceeding is a putative class action that theoretically could 
be financially significant enough to disrupt the litigation 
peace achieved by the settlement.  The parties disagree as to 
the potential damages that could result from a successful class 
action.  Debtors assert that it could require them to make 
payments of up to $81.7 million.  Debtors’ Letter at 2–3 
(Mar. 8, 2013).  Appellants counter that the payments would 
only approach around $40 million.  Appellants’ Letter at 2–3 
(Mar. 20, 2013).   
Regardless of the amount involved, the most we can 
say of Debtors’ argument is that it asserts the finish without 
the steps to get there.  No class has been certified.  And 
assuming one is certified, we have little information about 
what it would look like.  The claims of many putative class 
members, for example, may be precluded if they acquiesced 
to a representative proceeding in lieu of individual adversary 
proceedings, explicitly agreed to the Producer Settlement, or 
failed to object to the plan as impermissibly discharging their 
claims without an adversary proceeding.  We cannot assume 
that allowing Appellants to seek class certification will risk 
unraveling the plan in the absence of more detailed 
information about the potential class claims.  As then-Judge 
Alito explained, the feared consequences of a successful 
appeal are often more appropriately dealt with by fashioning 
limited relief at the remedial stage than by refusing to hear the 
merits of an appeal at its outset.  See Continental I, 91 F.3d at 
571–72 (Alito, J., dissenting).  This is particularly true where, 
as here, the perceived harms are at best speculative.   
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C. Injury to Third Parties 
Debtors also assert that a successful appeal will harm 
third parties.  In particular they have identified four groups 
they claim would be adversely affected: (1) lenders; (2) 
equity investors; (3) customers and suppliers; and (4) creditor 
constituencies.  Debtors’ Br. at 53–55.  These groups entered 
into a variety of transactions and agreements in connection 
with the reorganization plan.  Granting Appellants the relief 
they request, in Debtors’ view, would harm these third parties 
by upsetting their expectation that plan confirmation was 
final.  We address each group in turn. 
We begin with the lenders, who provided exit 
financing for the Reorganized Debtors.  According to 
Debtors,  
[t]he Exit Financing Participants 
and those other third party entities 
relying on the Exit Facility would 
be severely harmed should the 
Confirmation Order be reversed; 
if there is no longer a 
Confirmation Order, the new 
lenders under the Exit Facility 
would likely attempt to terminate 
the Exit Facility and the 
Reorganized Debtors would be 
unable to continue their business, 
which would likely lead to the 
inability of the Reorganized 
Debtors to repay the borrowed 
funds.    
Debtors’ Br. at 54.  This argument is counterintuitive.  Why 
would these lenders terminate the credit facility if doing so 
21 
 
would cause harm to themselves?  Moreover, we have no 
evidence supporting the inference that they would take this 
action.  Debtors’ rely on an affidavit by Robert Fitzgerald—
the Chief Financial Officer of the Reorganized Debtors’ 
parent company, SemGroup Corporation (“SemGroup”)—to 
support this argument.  Appellants’ App. at 627–28.  That 
affidavit merely describes the credit facilities into which the 
Reorganized Debtors and the lenders entered.  It says nothing 
about whether the lenders would seek to invalidate the loan 
agreements if Appellants are granted relief, let alone that they 
would have the legal right to do so. 
We are also not persuaded that the equity investors 
will be materially harmed.  As discussed, the amounts of 
Appellants’ individual claims are relatively insignificant, and 
it is premature to assume that the putative class action will 
result in significantly greater financial exposure.  Regardless 
of the potential amount, moreover, there is little reason to 
think that the Reorganized Debtors’ financial well-being—
and thus the prospects of their equity investors—would be 
threatened by granting Appellants relief.  SemGroup has 
emerged from bankruptcy in robust financial health.  
According to its public securities filings,
 
in March 2012 
(shortly before the District Court dismissed Appellants’ 
appeal as equitably moot), SemGroup had over $73 million in 
cash or cash equivalents, substantially more than the $50 
million it was provided under the plan when it emerged from 
bankruptcy.
10
  It also had in excess of $140 million in 
                                              
10
 In their briefing, Debtors referred to this $50 million 
figure as “working capital,” which is commonly calculated as 
total current assets less total current liabilities.  Following our 
request for clarification, they informed us that the $50 million 
figure actually refers to the cash or cash equivalents that, 
under the reorganization plan, SemGroup was permitted to 
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working capital.
11
  Moreover, as the Fitzgerald affidavit 
attests, the Reorganized Debtors have a variety of credit 
sources available to fund their operations.  Appellants’ App. 
at 628–29.  With this positive backdrop, it is not self-evident 
that Appellants’ claims pose any significant risk, and we have 
not been provided any testimony or other evidence to the 
contrary. 
Harm to the final two groups—the Reorganized 
Debtors’ customers and suppliers and the Debtors’ 
                                                                                                     
have on hand immediately following confirmation.  
Appellants’ Letter at 1 (Mar. 8, 2013). 
 
11
 These cash (or cash equivalent) and working capital 
figures are drawn from SemGroup’s Securities and Exchange 
Commission Quarterly Report for the period ended on March 
31, 2012.  SemGroup Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 
(May 9, 2012).  We take judicial notice of this publicly filed 
report.  See Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1); Fed. R. Evid. 201 
advisory committee’s note (“In accord with the usual view, 
judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceedings, 
whether in the trial court or on appeal.”).   
 
Looking further out, SemGroup’s financial future 
appears likely to remain stable.  According to its Securities 
and Exchange Commission Quarterly Report for the period 
ended on March 31, 2013, by that time SemGroup’s cash and 
cash equivalents exceeded $77 million and its working capital 
topped $142 million.  SemGroup Corp., Quarterly Report 
(Form 10-Q) (May 9, 2013).  And all this, of course, says 
nothing of liability insurance that the Reorganized Debtors 
may have to offset any future losses they do incur if 
Appellants ultimately win their adversary proceeding. 
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creditors—appears lacking as well.  According to Debtors, 
the customers and suppliers will be hurt because the 
Reorganized Debtors have assumed a variety of executory 
contracts and unexpired leases in an attempt to solidify these 
business relationships.  However, they have not explained 
why granting Appellants relief would require them now to 
reject those agreements.  Debtors contend the creditor 
constituencies will be harmed because granting relief would 
destabilize a series of settlements they have made with those 
constituencies.  But the only settlement identified by Debtors 
is the Producer Settlement, and (as discussed) it does not 
appear that settlement will be imperiled.  
D. Policy Considerations 
Preserving the finality of plan confirmation to 
encourage parties to move forward with plan execution 
justifies forbearing the exercise of jurisdiction only where 
precluding the appeal will prevent a perverse outcome.  As 
the Supreme Court has instructed on numerous occasions, 
“federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction 
that is conferred upon them by Congress.”  Quackenbush v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (collecting cases).  
The presumptive position remains that federal courts should 
hear and decide on the merits cases properly before them. 
 When equitable mootness is used as a sword rather 
than a shield, this presumption is upended.  Appellants have 
repeatedly advanced the contention that they are entitled to an 
adversary proceeding.  They filed a complaint to begin such a 
proceeding, objected to the rulings of the Bankruptcy Court 
disallowing it, and sought interlocutory appellate review in 
the District Court.  Denying them review now—based on 
speculation of future harms—would be distinctly inequitable, 
the antithesis of the equity required for “mootness.”   
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V. Conclusion 
Dismissing an appeal as equitably moot should be rare, 
occurring only where there is sufficient justification to 
override the statutory appellate rights of the party seeking 
review.  Here, the evidentiary record does not support 
Debtors’ contentions that a successful appeal would collapse 
their plan of reorganization or undermine the justifiable 
reliance of third parties to their significant harm.  Holding 
otherwise was an abuse of discretion.  We thus reverse the 
District Court’s dismissal, and remand for it to hear 
Appellants’ appeal on its merits.12   
 
                                              
12
 Appellants have a long road ahead despite their 
procedural victory here.  On remand to the District Court, 
they will need to demonstrate that they are entitled to an 
adversary proceeding.  If they win on that issue and continue 
to pursue their putative class claims, they will need to obtain 
class certification.  And regardless whether they assert 
individual or class claims, they will have to litigate them 
successfully.  We take no position on the likelihood of 
Appellants achieving any of these results.  
